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I. Introduction 
In response to the governance crisis in which the EU found itself at the end of the 1990’s, different ‘new 
modes of governance’ have been tried and tested. In this contribution, the link between two of these 
modes will be highlighted. First there has been the increased reliance on soft law to deliver policy and 
secondly the EU legislator has created numerous EU agencies which are established to secure a better and 
more uniform application of EU law.  
These two trends of agencification and soft law will first briefly be situated. Taking these trends together 
it is revealing to note that few of the agencies’ acts meet the requirement of hard law in that they are 
attributed legally binding force. This is unsurprising since  a lot of the acts of EU agencies sare adopted 
under ‘composite procedures’, which are characterised by the joined participation of different authorities 
belonging to different legal orders (e.g. EU agency, EU committees, Commission and Member States’ 
authorities). Other procedures depend on the joined participation of an EU agency, committees and the 
Commission. Whereas the final outcome of all these procedures will often be a binding act, the agency’s 
contribution itself generally lacks binding effect. 
Following these introductory observations, the focus will be on the link between agencies and soft law. 
The EU legislator not only increasingly relies on EU agencies but the EU legislator has also increasingly 
endowed EU agencies with soft law powers, begging the question why the EU legislator has not chosen to 
simply grant more ‘hard law’ powers to EU agencies. An important part of the answer to this question 
relates to the uncertain constitutional position of agencies and the process of agencification in the EU 
legal order. A combined reading of the Meroni and Romano cases and the institutional balance indeed cast 
serious doubts on involving EU agencies in EU decision-making. Having EU agencies adopt soft instead 
of hard law may then circumvent (the most pressing) constitutional concerns even if such a circumvention 
does not fully meet the constitutional concerns at a more fundamental level.  
After presenting some examples of soft law adopted by agencies, the importance of the upcoming case UK 
v. Parliament and Council will be highlighted since the EU legislator has continued to seek the limits of 
what is possible under primary law by granting significant powers to the most-recently established 
agencies. This trend is very clear in the case of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 
One of the legislative acts granting such powers to ESMA is now challenged by the UK resulting in a case 
of fundamental importance for the future of the agency instrument in the EU. Specifically for the issue of 
soft law and should the Court indeed prohibit such hard law powers, this could give new incentives to the 
legislator to grant further soft law powers to EU agencies as an alternative to the prohibited hard law 
powers. 
In a final section, attention will therefore be devoted to the possibilities, for the legislator, to work out a 
framework in which agencies could exercise these soft law powers. 
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II. A new mode of governance: soft law 
As noted by Senden,1 the EU’s reliance on ‘new modes of governance’ to better deliver EU policies 
gained an important impetus with the Commission’s White Paper on Governance. As regards soft law, the 
Commission i.a. noted that “The European Union will rightly continue to be judged by the impact of its 
regulation on the ground [...] Effective decision-making also requires the combination of different policy 
instruments (various forms of legislation, programmes, guidelines, use of structural funding, etc.) to meet 
Treaty objectives.”2 In the White Paper, the Commission also suggested the idea of ensuring a better 
application of EU rules through greater reliance on EU agencies.3 Senden herself also noted the rise of EU 
agencies as a new mode of governance together with the rise of soft law,4 but what is foremost interesting 
is that the former also relies to a considerable extent on the latter. Before exploring this issue, it is 
necessary to further explore the notion of soft law. 
Following an evaluation of the different definitions of soft law which could be found in doctrine,5 Senden 
proposed her own rather specific definition, describing soft law as “[r]ules of conduct that are laid down 
in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have 
certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects.”6 By including 
the notion of ‘rules of conduct’ in the definition, Senden emphasised the normative effect of soft law. For 
the purposes of her study, this emphasis was obvious since Senden analysed soft law as an alternative to 
legislation. However in general, and for the purpose of the present contribution, the notion of soft law 
should not be reserved to normative instruments. By shortening Senden’s definition to “instruments which 
have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal 
effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects”, its scope is actually broadened and more 
instruments enter the radar.  
III. A new mode of governance: agencies 
A second notion from the title which deserves some clarification is that of agencification which is a 
process whereby the role of EU agencies becomes increasingly important within the EU administration. 
As such, the process has a quantitative and a qualitative dimension.7 Quantitatively, a continuous growth 
in the number of EU agencies may be noted.8 Qualitatively, one may note that the EU legislator is 
progressively pushing the limits in empowering these EU agencies. Whereas the first agencies had 
advisory powers at the most, more recently established agencies may for instance adopt binding decisions 
vis-à-vis national authorities or impose sanctions on market operators. The evolution, since the 1990’s, of 
                                                   
1
 Linda Senden, Soft law in European Community law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 21. 
2
 European Commission, 2001, 'European Governance: A White Paper', COM (2001) 428 final, p. 20. 
3
 Ibid., 23-4. 
4
 Linda Senden, Soft law in European Community law, o.c., p. 21. 
5
 Ibid., 111-2. 
6
 Ibid., 112. 
7
 Bach and Jann make a roughly similar distinctions between structural and procedural agencification (at national 
level). In their own words: “[p]ar agencification structurelle, nous entendons les changements opérés dans 
l'organisation formelle des tâches publiques, comme la création de nouvelles agences […] par agencification 
procédurale, nous entendons un transfert d'autorité des ministères vers les agences.” See Tobias Bach and Werner 
Jann, 'Des animaux dans un zoo administratif: le changement organisationnel et l'autonomie des agences en 
Allemagne', (2010) 76 Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives 3, pp. 470-1. 
8
 Using Senden’s work as a reference once again, at the time of writing (2004), she noted the existence of 12 
agencies. Today, there are over 30 EU agencies. 
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these two dimensions has meant that agencification as a process today is more than the sum of its 
component parts. Whereas the four existing EU agencies in 1990 could at that time still be seen as a 
curiosité institutionnelle this is not the case anymore today. 
Finally, because the notion of agencification ultimately depends on the notion of EU agency, the latter 
also needs to be defined. The EU agencies referred to in this contribution are what the Institutions 
themselves incorrectly refer to as the ‘decentralised agencies’9 which are distinguished from the 
‘executive agencies’. Given the lack of official definition for a ‘decentralised agency’ (henceforth: EU 
agency), EU agencies will be defined here as permanent bodies under EU public law, established by the 
Institutions through secondary legislation and endowed with their own legal personality.10 
IV. Soft law as circumventing the constitutional objections against agencification 
After having clarified the key notions of this contribution it is possible to look into actual subject of this 
contribution, i.e. the use of soft law by agencies to ease constitutional objections against agencification. 
This may seem odd at first sight, since the use of soft law itself has in the past been criticised on 
constitutional grounds. Senden for instance questioned whether “the use of soft law entail[s] an 
unacceptable bypassing of the competences of other institutions in the decision-making process?”11 
Observing that it is “possible that the institutional balance can be infringed not only through the choice of 
instrument as such, but also through the use of soft law instruments as a means of parallel legislation.”12 
Precisely this seems to have been an important consideration for the Court when it ruled in the case 
France v. Commission on the Commission’s guidelines on regulatory cooperation with the USA. In this 
case, France argued the guidelines constituted a binding agreement and should therefore have been 
concluded in accordance with the procedure of Article 218 TFEU. The Commission on the other hand 
insisted that it could adopt these guidelines by itself since they were merely non-binding. Disagreeing with 
France, the Court found the guidelines to be non-binding but did not follow the Commission either and 
observed that “the fact that a measure such as the Guidelines is not binding is [not] sufficient to confer on 
[the Commission] the competence to adopt it. Determining the conditions under which such a measure 
                                                   
9
 See the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies, adopted by the three Institutions in the summer of 2012. 
The adjective ‘decentralised’ is incorrect however, since agencification is not a centrifugal, but rather a centripetal, 
process. See Colin Scott, 'Agencies for European Regulatory Governance: A Regimes Approach', in Geradin, Petit 
and Muñoz (eds.), Regulation through Agencies in the EU, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2005, pp. 70-1. I.a. because 
of this reason, Sanchez Barrueco’s definition is not followed either. She defines an EU agency as “tout organisme de 
droit public européen, autonome du point de vue légal et financier, créé par une institution communautaire afin de 
décentraliser une ou plusieurs des fonctions qui lui ont été attribuées. Les éléments saillants d'une agence dans 
l'Union européenne seraient donc: création par le biais législatif (1), personnalité juridique (2), décentralisation des 
fonctions (3) et autonomie financière (4).” See Maria Luisa Sanchez Barrueco, 'L'Agence européenne de défense, un 
organe intergouvernemental au service d'une institution communautaire?', (2008) Revue du Droit de l'Union 
Européenne 3, p. 513. 
10
 This definition is an adaptation of the one worked out by Fischer-Appelt. See Dorothee Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: eine Studie zu Rechtsproblemen, Legitimation und Kontrolle europäischer 
Agenturen mit interdisziplinären und rechtsvergleichenden Bezügen, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1999, p. 38. The 
elements of the specific tasks entrusted to agencies and the agencies’ relative independence in Fischer-Appelt’s 
definition have been omitted from the present one since it is difficult to imagine the EU legislator would establish 
new bodies without entrusting them with some sort of tasks and because the independency or autonomy of the EU 
agencies is covered by their separate legal personality.  
11
 Linda Senden, Soft law in European Community law, o.c., p. 489. 
12
 Ibid. 
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may be adopted requires that the division of powers and the institutional balance established by the 
Treaty in the field of the common commercial policy be duly taken into account.”13 This could thus be seen 
as the Court shutting the door for, a circumvention of hard law procedural requirements by adopting, 
parallel legislation in the form of soft law. 
Lefevre made similar observations to those of Senden in his study of Commission communications for the 
implementation of EU law by national authorities.14 These communications may codify the case law of the 
Court on a specific issue, or they may contain the Commission’s own interpretation of a piece or body of 
legislation. The Commission’s own interpretation not being as authoritative as the Court’s interpretation. 
As a result, “in areas where it has no decision-making power, the Commission may nonetheless influence 
the behaviour of Member States inadvertently, by blurring the boundaries between the authoritative 
interpretation of the Courts and its own interpretation, which is not binding.”15 If, through the adoption of 
soft law, the Commission were to substitute the obligations actually imposed by EU legislation on 
Member States with obligations preferred by the Commission, this would obviously result in an 
unauthorised extension of the Commission’s powers.16 
That this risk is not hypothetical may be illustrated by reference to two recent cases before the Court of 
Justice. In Commission v. Austria and Commission v. Germany, the implementation of the first Railway 
package by these two Member States was at issue. The Commission had argued that in these Member 
States the railway infrastructure manager was insufficiently independent from its overarching holding 
company. To clarify the independence requirements prescribed by EU legislation, the Commission had 
annexed some further criteria to its communication on the implementation of the first package.17 In the 
two cases before the Court, it had then attempted to show Germany and Austria had not properly 
transposed the first railway package, because their national legislation did not meet the Commission’s 
criteria as set out in the annex. The Court however dismissed this argument by noting i.a. that the annex 
was a non-binding Commission document,18 and proceeded by scrutinising the Commission’s plea against 
the actual wording of the relevant legislation, rather than the Commission’s interpretation of that 
legislation. 
The possibility that EU institutions will rely on soft law to acquire de facto competences which have not 
been provided de iure may therefore be seen as a significant risk related to the use of soft law and a matter 
of constitutional importance since the vertical and horizontal distribution of powers within the EU would 
be affected by such competence creep. 
                                                   
13
 Case C-233/02, French Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, [2004] ECR I-2759, para. 40. 
14
 Obviously these types of act are only one specific category of soft law which may be adopted by the Commission. 
On the possibility and desirability of a Commission competence to address administrative guidelines to Member 
State authorities, see also Geike Adam and Gerd Winter, 'Commission guidance addressed to member state agencies', 
in Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories of European Union Law, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1996, pp. 629-44. 
15
 Silvère Lefevre, 'Interpretative communications and the implementation of Community law at national level', 
(2004) 29 European Law Review 6, p. 813. 
16
 Ibid., 812-5. 
17
 See European Commission, 3 May 2006, 'Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the first 
railway package', COM (2006) 189 final. For the actual annex, see European Commission, 3 May 2006, 
'Commission Staff Working Document annexed to the Communication on the implementation of the railway 
infrastructure package Directives (‘First Railway Package’)', SEC (2006) 530. 
18
 Case C-555/10, European Commission v. Republic of Austria, [2013] ECR nyr, para. 62; Case C-556/10, 
European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, [2013] ECR nyr, para. 62. 
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Turning to the EU agencies, the constitutional objections which may be raised against these bodies are 
equally evident. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU primary law was completely silent 
on the topic of EU agencies. Post-Lisbon, primary law does refer to EU agencies but it does not contain an 
explicit enabling clause giving competence to the EU legislator to establish these bodies, let alone the 
competence to delegate certain tasks to these bodies. Instead, Article 291 TFEU now explicitly makes 
clear that implementation of EU law is firstly a matter which is left to the Member States.19 At the same 
time, this Article has strengthened the position of the Commission in the event that implementation should 
be done at EU level.20 The introduction of delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU further strengthened the 
Commission as well because it is the sole authority competent to adopt these acts and because the efficacy 
of the control mechanisms available to the Parliament and Council may be questioned.21 These Articles 
provide that implementation and modification of EU legislation is an affair of the Commission, 
Parliament, Council and Member States, but they do not foresee the involvement of EU agencies. In 
addition, Regulation 182/201122 which sets out the new comitology procedures under Article 291 TFEU 
does not mention any role for the EU agencies either, despite the Commission’s reliance on their drafts 
and opinions in a lot of these procedures.  
The process of agencification noted above has thus proceeded in a constitutional vacuum. One of the most 
fundamental questions relates to the qualitative dimension of the process, i.e. how far can the EU 
legislator go in empowering these bodies. In doctrine, an answer to this question is usually sought in the 
1958 Meroni ruling.23  In this ruling which dealt with a delegation of powers from the High Authority to 
two bodies established under private law, the Court laid down a doctrine on the delegation of powers. The 
exact content of this doctrine is unclear,24 but most authors agree that it applies to the EU agencies and 
that it prohibits the delegation of discretionary powers. Whether Meroni may be applied to agencies and 
whether the notion of delegation is an apt description of the legal relationship between an EU agency and 
the EU legislator may be debated however.25 One of the elements explicitly mentioned by the Court in 
Meroni for instance was the prohibition for the delegating authority to delegate more powers than it itself 
held (nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet). Since the EU legislator, when establishing EU 
agencies, does not transfer its own powers to these bodies, Gautier concluded that the empowerment of 
EU agencies could not be qualified as a delegation.26 In any case, even if these matters of principle are 
                                                   
19
 Claude Blumann, 'Le système normatif de l'Union européenne vingt ans après le traité de Maastricht', (2012) 
Revue des Affaires Européennes 2, p. 250. 
20
 Ibid., 251. 
21
 See Paul Craig, 'The Hierarchy of Norms', in Tridimas and Nebbia (eds.), European Union law for the twenty-first 
century: rethinking the new legal order, Oxford, Hart, 2004, pp. 80-4. 
22
 Regulation (EU) 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers, O.J. 2011 L 55/13. 
23
 Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgische S.p.A. v. High Authority, [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
24
 Some authors seem to claim the doctrine boils down to the single requirement prohibiting the delegation of 
discretionary powers. Other authors identified additional requirements, such as the nemo plus iuris rule, the 
requirement that a delegation should be explicit, the requirement that the delegating authority should continue to 
supervise the delegate authority, the requirement that judicial scrutiny by the Court should be maintained, the 
requirement that the institutional balance may not be upset or the requirement that the delegation should be necessary 
for the performance of the delegated tasks. 
25
 See Merijn Chamon, 'EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine Make Sense?', (2010) 17 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 3, pp. 281-305. 
26
 Yves Gautier, La délégation en droit communautaire, Strasbourg, Strasbourg 3, 1995, PhD Thesis, p. 402. 
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ignored for the time being, Meroni remains problematic since it raises the thorny issue of when a power is 
discretionary in nature and when it is not.27 
A second case before the Court seems especially relevant for the present topic. In Romano, the powers of 
the Administrative Commission for the Social Security of Migrant Workers was at issue. This 
Administrative Commission was provided for under Regulation 1408/71 and had i.a. been made 
competent to solve administrative or interpretative problems flowing from the Regulation. Ultimately, this 
raised the question whether the decisions of the Administrative Commission were binding on the national 
institutions implementing the rules on social security. In Romano the Court ruled that “a body such as the 
Administrative Commission may not be empowered by the Council to adopt acts having the force of 
Law.”28 Since the Court referred to “actes revêtant un caractère normatif” and “Rechtsakte mit 
normativem Charakter” in the French and German language versions of its ruling, it would seem that the 
Court only excluded the possibility of the Administrative Commission adopting rules of general 
application, leaving open the issue of individual binding decisions. However, when the Court explained 
the reason for disallowing such a competence, it referred to (i) the fact that the acts of the Administrative 
Commission could not be challenged or reviewed under the then Articles 173 and 177 EEC  (current 
Articles 263 and 267 TFEU) and to (ii) Article 155 EEC, which i.a. provided that the Commission would 
“exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by the 
latter.” The Court thus seemed to suggest that the Council could indeed decide to empower a second body, 
but that this body should be the Commission, not some other body. Based on these two principle 
considerations, it does not make much sense to confine the consequences of Romano to acts of general 
application. Instead Romano would seem to prohibit the adoption of any type of binding measure by 
bodies such as the Administrative Commission, as was suggested by Türk.29 
Of course, since Romano primary law has evolved and Articles 263 and 267 TFEU would now allow the 
acts of the Administrative Commission to be reviewed. Significant changes have been made in relation to 
Article 155 EEC as well, but these foremost seem to have further strengthened the position of the 
Commission (cf. supra), rather than opening the possibility of empowering bodies other than the 
Commission with implementing tasks. The reference in Romano to Article 155 EEC therefore even seems 
to have gained in significance today.30 
Taking the view that both the Meroni and Romano rulings apply to the EU agencies, as the Commission 
does,31 undermines the prospects of agencification in a qualitative sense as EU agencies would not be 
allowed to adopt binding measures and would be not allowed to make discretionary choices. There are not 
that many examples one can think if in which it is worthwhile to establish a body with such limited 
                                                   
27
 See Merijn Chamon, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, o.c., pp. 293-5. 
28
 Case 98/80, Giuseppe Romano v Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité, [1981] ECR 1241, para. 20. 
29
 Alexander Türk, 'Case Law in the Area of the Implementation of EC Law', in Pedler and Schaefer (eds.), Shaping 
European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process, Maastricht, European 
Institute of Public Administration, 1996, p. 186. 
30
 For a more elaborate discussion of Romano, its possible repercussions today and the relation between Meroni and 
Romano, see Merijn Chamon, 'EU agencies between "Meroni" and "Romano" or the devil and the deep blue sea', 
(2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 4, pp. 1055-75. 
31
 European Commission, 25 February 2005, 'Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the 
European regulatory agencies', COM (2005) 59 final, p. 5. 
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powers, let alone an EU agency which is a quite ‘heavy’ form of organisation given its separate legal 
personality and budget. 
V. Soft law and EU agencies 
To escape the rigid limits to agencification imposed by these two rulings, the EU legislator has granted 
soft law, rather than hard law, powers to EU agencies.32 In providing that an EU agency may adopt an 
opinion, report or draft, the legislator has often stopped one step short of granting the agency with a 
decision-making power. By providing for procedures in which the Commission and the agencies work 
together, whereby the latter gives advice to the former, the Romano ruling is then formally respected. 
Similarly, even if agencies in their advisory capacity have to weigh up different interests, which would 
require the exercise of discretionary powers, it is possible to claim that the actual discretionary choices are 
made by the final decision-making authority, i.e. the Commission.  
The European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) are good 
examples of agencies which have been granted the power to adopt opinions on individual decisions. 
Typically these are decisions on applications by undertakings, which are ultimately adopted by the 
Commission. Despite the opinions being non-binding and hence soft law, they can be characterised as 
authoritative since the Commission is under a special obligation to take account of the substance of the 
opinion. The actual purpose of the involvement of the agencies is that the Commission should not deviate 
from their scientific advice. This, combined with the special obligation which rests on the Commission, 
means that EU legislation often provides that the Commission should explain why, if so, it does not follow 
the agency’s advice.33 
A special type of individual decision is the decision to impose a sanction. The Commission’s power to 
impose sanctions on individual undertakings is well known and established in the field of competition 
policy. However, the Commission has also been granted such a power in the field of pharmaceuticals and 
aviation safety in the event that an economic operator after having obtained an authorisation for a 
medicinal or aviation product, does not respect the conditions imposed together with the authorisation. 
The EMA Regulation and the Regulation establishing the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
provide that the agencies may issue requests to the Commission to impose such sanctions on economic 
                                                   
32
 In addition to the selection of examples provided below, see the observations made by Chiti on EU agencies 
involved in rulemaking, either through the adoption of binding rules or through the adoption of soft law. Edoardo 
Chiti, 'European Agencies' Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment', (2013) 19 European Law Journal 1, 
pp. 94-100. 
33
 In the regime for GMO authorisation for instance, the Commission prepares a draft decision under a comitology 
procedure based on the opinion of the EFSA. If its draft decision deviates from the opinion, the regulation prescribes 
that “the Commission shall provide an explanation for the differences.” See Article 7 (1) of Regulation (EC) 
1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on genetically modified food and feed, O.J. 2003 L 268/1. 
The wording of these provisions may also vary. For instance, when one Member State disagrees with the reference 
Member State’s assessment report of a medicinal product under the decentralised procedure, the Commission will 
take a decision under a comitology procedure following a scientific opinion by the EMA. The relevant directive 
thereby provides: “Where, exceptionally, the draft decision is not in accordance with the opinion of the Agency, the 
Commission shall also annex a detailed explanation of the reasons for the differences.” (own emphasis). See Article 
33 of Directive (EC) 2001/83 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use, O.J. 2001 L 311/67. 
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operators.34 The procedure is thus initiated by the agency, leaving a discretion to the Commission whether 
or not to actually impose a fine or periodic penalty payment. 
During the 1990’s the power of opinion granted to agencies only related to individual decisions. However 
during the so called third wave of agency creation this changed. The European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) for instance is primarily tasked with an operational mission, Article 2 (2)a provides that the 
EMSA shall assist the Commission “in the preparatory work for updating and developing relevant legal 
acts of the Union.” However, the agencies’ powers are not confined to such a supporting role in the 
development of new legislation. Agencies are also involved in the implementation or modification, 
through implementing and delegated acts, of legislation. Such involvement may be informal, but often the 
agency’s role is also formally recognised. In the Regulation on food information to consumers for instance 
it is provided that “[a]ny Union measure in the field of food information law which is likely to have an 
effect on public health shall be adopted after consultation of the EFSA.”35 Sometimes, EU legislation goes 
even further than the mandatory consultation of an agency. The Regulation establishing the European 
Aviation Safety Agency for instance provides that “[i]n order to assist the Commission in the preparation 
of proposals for basic principles, applicability and essential requirements to be presented to the European 
Parliament and to the Council and the adoption of the implementing rules, the Agency shall prepare drafts 
thereof.”36 The power to draft these new rules thereby comes on top of other soft law powers of the 
EASA. After all, the agency also adopts ‘certification specifications’, ‘acceptable means of compliance’, 
and ‘guidance material’ as referred to under Article 19 of the EASA Regulation. In these instruments, the 
EASA sets out its own non-binding interpretation of the provisions of the relevant legislation, delegated 
acts and implementing acts. For economic operators these non-binding instruments are not without 
relevance since the EASA has also received the, hard law, power to decide on applications by those 
operators for certification. The European Railway Agency exercises a similar power to draft further 
regulation since Article 6 of its establishing Regulation37 provides that it “shall recommend to the 
Commission the common safety methods and the common safety targets” foreseen in the Railway Safety 
Directive.38 
Perhaps the most far-reaching example of such a drafting power may be found in the mandates of the 
European Supervisory Authorities in the financial sector. As regards the regulatory technical standards 
adopted by the Commission under Article 290 TFEU, the establishing Regulations of the ESA’s provide 
that  
                                                   
34
 See Article 84 (3) of the EMA Regulation and Article 25 of the EASA Regulation.  
35
 Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of food 
information to consumers, O.J. 2011 L 304/18. See also Daniele Bianchi, 'La Comitologie dans le droit agro-
alimentaire: une procédure complexe au service d'imperatifs de participation démocratique et de controle étatique', in 
Mahieu and Merten-Lentz (eds.), Sécurité alimentaire: Nouveaux enjeux et perspectives, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2013, 
pp. 200-1. 
36
 See Article 19 (1) of Regulation (EC) 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules 
in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 
91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC, O.J. 2008 L 79/1. 
37
 Regulation (EC) 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Railway 
Agency, O.J. 2004 L 164/1. 
38
 Directive 2004/49 of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety on the Community's railways and 
amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and 
safety certification, O.J. 2004 L 164/44. 
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The Commission should endorse those draft regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts 
pursuant to Article 290 TFEU in order to give them binding legal effect. They should be subject to 
amendment only in very restricted and extraordinary circumstances, since the Authority is the actor in 
close contact with and knowing best the daily functioning of financial markets. Draft regulatory technical 
standards would be subject to amendment if they were incompatible with Union law, did not respect the 
principle of proportionality or ran counter to the fundamental principles of the internal market for 
financial services as reflected in the acquis of Union financial services legislation. The Commission 
should not change the content of the draft regulatory technical standards prepared by the Authority 
without prior coordination with the Authority. To ensure a smooth and expeditious adoption process for 
those standards, the Commission’s decision to endorse draft regulatory technical standards should be 
subject to a time limit.39 
In addition to these extra requirements, the Regulations also provide that the Commission, should it want 
to amend the drafts cannot do so without first referring the draft together with its comments back to the 
relevant ESA.  
These examples of instruments adopted by EU agencies are quite diverse but they all fall under the 
definition of soft law. They are instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force, but  they 
have real practical and indirect legal effects. The simple fact that the agencies house the relevant expertise 
at EU level, rather than the Commission, in itself de facto ties the hands of the latter. If the Commission 
would want to deviate from the line set out by the agency, it can do so but it would evidently need to argue 
its case by reference to alternative expertise. Depending on the case, if such expertise may be found it will 
usually have to be sought outside the EU framework. Incidentally, this would undermine and question the 
whole idea of establishing an EU agency as the EU expertise in a given field. 
Apart from this practical reason, this soft law adopted by EU agencies is also hardened by the legislator by 
providing that the Commission cannot deal with these instruments as if they were noncommittal opinions. 
Instead, the Commission may have to give reasons when it deviates from the agencies’ opinions, or the 
Commission may only alter drafts on specific grounds, or further procedural requirements have to be 
fulfilled before the Commission may modify such drafts. 
As was already briefly referred to above, some agencies have also been endowed with the power to adopt 
individually binding decisions.40 Under a strict reading of Meroni and Romano, again assuming they apply 
to EU agencies, this was already questionable. In doctrine such a power was reconciled with the Court’s 
                                                   
39
 See recitals 23 of the preambles to the EBA and ESMA Regulations and recital 22 of the preamble to the EIOPA 
Regulation. Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority, O.J. 2010 L 331/12; Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority), O.J. 2010 L 331/48; Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), O.J. 
2010 L 331/84. 
40
 These are the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM), the Community Plant Variety Office 
(CPVO), the EASA, the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the ESA’s. In addition, under 
the fourth railway package which has been recently proposed by the Commission, the ERA would also receive such a 
power. 
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jurisprudence by reference to the limited mandate of these agencies,41 and by pointing out that 
administrative discretion is something else than legislative discretion.42 Especially the latter is interesting 
since it would help explain why EU agencies have been granted soft law powers when it comes to the 
adoption of generally applicable acts such as formal legislation, delegated acts and implementing acts. 
As is apparent from the title of this paper, it could be suggested that the constitutional objections against 
agencification are being circumvented by the legislator’s choice to endow agencies with soft law 
powers.43 However, reflecting deeper on the subject reveals that this technique does not actually address 
the fundamental constitutional questions in play. If the Treaties accord special status to the Commission 
under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU and to its monopoly of legislative initiative, can the legislator hollow 
out the Commission’s function by entrusting ever larger portions of the preparatory work for legislative, 
delegated and implementing acts to agencies? If policy choices are increasingly determined by the 
preparatory work of the agencies, can the formal decision-maker (EU legislator or Commission depending 
on the act) be held accountable for (negative) policy outcomes? How is the democratic quality of decision-
making affected in view of the fact that the European Parliament cannot control the EU agencies as it 
controls the Commission? If the Treaties accord special importance to the ‘Community method’ how is 
this method affected by the increasing role of EU agencies, whose management boards are dominated by 
the Member States? 
Having EU agencies adopt soft rather than hard law may ease the most acute constitutional objections but 
it does not resolve them. Instead the legislator has been kicking this constitutional can down the road and 
this technique actually worked quite well although it also came at a price since it has unavoidably resulted 
in more complex procedures.  
This may be illustrated by reference to the network codes for the electricity and gas markets. Articles 6 of 
Regulations 714/2009 and 715/2009 set out the procedure for their adoption and provide that the 
Commission must first ask the ACER to work out a non-binding framework guideline which contributes 
to non-discrimination, effective competition and an efficiently functioning internal market. If the 
Commission is of the opinion that the ACER’s framework guideline is not in line with these principles it 
can request the ACER to resubmit its framework guideline. If the ACER fails to do so, or simply fails to 
produce a framework guideline, the Commission may adopt one itself. Based on such a framework 
guideline, the ENTSO for Gas or Electricity, depending on the case, shall be asked by the Commission to 
develop a network code. The ENTSO will submit its draft to the ACER which may request the ENTSO to 
resubmit its draft, otherwise the ACER may request the Commission to adopt the network code. If the 
Commission decides not to do so, it must state its reasons. Should the ENTSO fail to submit a network 
code, the Commission may request the ACER to work out the network code or it may adopt a network 
code on its own initiative following consultation with the ACER and the ENTSO. 
                                                   
41
 Ronald van Ooik, 'The growing importance of agencies in the EU: shifting governance and the institutional 
balance', in Deirdre and Wessel (eds.), Good governance and the European Union: reflections on concepts, 
institutions and substance, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2005, pp. 150-2. 
42
 Jens-Peter Schneider, 'A Common Framework for decentralized EU agencies and the Meroni doctrine', (2009) 61 
Administrative Law Review Special Issue, p. 38. 
43
 See also in relation to Meroni Linda Senden and Ton van den Brink, Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule-
Making, Brussels, European Parliament, 2012, p. 65. 
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Such complexity obviously comes at a cost and in urgent situations where authorities need to act in a swift 
manner, such procedures stand in the way of effective action. Perhaps this is why the EU legislator has 
abandoned all self-restraint in relation to the empowerment of agencies in the financial sector, when it 
adopted Regulation 236/2012 which regulates short selling.44 This regulation i.a. provides that the ESMA, 
one of the ESA’s, may prohibit or impose conditions on the entry by natural or legal persons into short 
sales. These measures would of course be generally applicable, leaving no question on whether they 
would fall under Romano. At the same time, it is beyond doubt that the decision whether or not to impose 
such a measure would require discretionary choices to be made, weighing off the financial stability and 
economic freedom of operators against each other.  
Another interesting power which has recently been granted to the ESMA is the power to fine economic 
operators. Annex I to Regulation 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories lists a number of infringements while Article 65 (1) of that regulation provides that where the 
“ESMA finds that a trade repository has, intentionally or negligently, committed one of the infringements 
listed in Annex I, it shall adopt a decision imposing a fine.”45 As regards sanctioning, the ESMA has thus 
been made the sole authority responsible, unlike in the pharmaceuticals and aviation sector where the 
EMA and EASA merely submit a proposal to the Commission to impose a fine. Even if the Regulation is 
quite detailed, narrowing the discretion left to ESMA, this power remains questionable in the light of the 
Court’s jurisprudence. In fact, when the European Parliament proposed, during the legislative process, to 
grant the ACER the very same sanctioning powers, the Commission refused to take over this amendment 
in its adapted proposal. According to the Commission, at that time, the Meroni ruling prevented the 
legislator from granting such powers to an agency.46 
VI. Challenging agencification: UK v. Parliament and Council 
By granting these new powers to the ESMA, the EU legislator clearly overstepped a limit and it did not 
take long before this was challenged before the Court. Unsurprisingly the applicant challenging ESMA’s 
powers under Regulation 236/2012 is the United Kingdom which has taken a critical stance towards 
agencification in financial regulation at EU level.47 In UK v. Parliament and Council, the UK is 
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 Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on short selling and certain aspects of 
credit default swaps, O.J. 2012 L 86/1. 
45
 Regulation (EU) 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories, O.J. 2012 L 201/1. 
46
 See European Commission, 18 June 2008, 'Commission Position on EP Amendments at first reading', 
SP(2008)4439 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do?i=15160&j=0&l=en. 
47
 On 7 December 2011, two days before the European Council Summit of 9 December 2011 UK Prime Minister 
Cameron declared the following in the House of Commons: “I think we should celebrate the fact that [the financial 
services sector] is a world-class industry, not just for Britain but for Europe—but it is absolutely vital for us to 
safeguard it. We are currently seeing it under continued regulatory attack from Brussels. I think that there will be an 
opportunity, particularly if there is a treaty at 27, to ensure that there are some safeguards—not just for the industry, 
but to give us greater power and control in terms of regulation here in the House of Commons. I think that that is in 
the interests of the entire country, and it is something that I will be fighting for on Friday.” See the Hansard of 7 
December 2011, column 294. In return for agreeing on a Treaty amendment which was proposed by Germany to 
tackle the euro-crisis, the UK delegation demanded safeguards alluded to in the quote above. The UK thus i.a. 
demanded that the unanimity rule would be reintroduced for financial sector legislation and it also demanded that the 
ESA’s executive powers would be clearly set out, the exercise of discretion being reserved to the Member States 
authorities. Should the latter demand have been granted it would have meant a codification of Meroni in primary 
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challenging the ESMA’s powers on four grounds: (i) since these are discretionary powers they are 
contrary to the Meroni doctrine; (ii) since they give rise to generally applicable measures they are contrary 
to Romano; (iii) since they give rise to non-legislative acts of general application they are contrary to 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU which reserve the power to adopt delegated acts to the Commission; lastly (iv) 
if these powers are used to adopt individual decisions directed at natural or legal persons the Regulation 
could not be based on Article 114 TFEU.48 
This case, which is still pending, is almost destined to be a landmark case in EU administrative law since 
it is the first time the Court is invited to scrutinise the powers of an EU agency under its Meroni and 
Romano jurisprudence.49 So far, these two rulings have only been used in legal doctrine to set out a 
framework for agencification. The consequences of the Court’s decision in this case will most likely not 
be confined to the ESMA or ESA’s but will be relevant to all the EU agencies. 
Incidentally, the outcome of the case may also have repercussions for the topic of this conference. This 
becomes clear if one maps out some of the options which are open to the Court, focussing on the first 
three arguments by the UK. 
As regards its previous jurisprudence one can envisage the Court has four main options. A first is the most 
radical, where the Court would conclude that Meroni and/or Romano are not relevant anymore under 
current EU law. Especially for Meroni, but also for Romano the reasons for such a move have been 
explored in doctrine.50 Such a move would be inspired by practical reasons which were already put 
forward in the 1960’s51 and which only have gained weight since then. From the Court’s legal perspective, 
the qualitative change from the ECSC Treaty (Meroni) and the EEC Treaty (Romano) to the EU Treaties 
under Lisbon could be used to argue that Meroni and Romano should not be upheld anymore. Although 
this would be easier to argue for Meroni than for Romano, the Court in both cases could argue that the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
law, at least for the agencies in the financial sector. In the end, the UK did not succeed since the plan to amend the 
Treaties was dropped and the Fiscal Compact was adopted as a separate treaty outside the EU framework. 
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 See Case C-270/12: Action brought on 1 June 2012 — United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v 
Council of the European Union, European Parliament, OJ 2012 C 273/3. 
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See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-378/00, Commission v. European Parliament and Council 
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Commission. See Thomas Van Damme, 'Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, The Queen, on the application of 
Alliance for Natural Health and Others v. Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales', (2006) 33 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 3, p. 314. The note by Van Damme is an English translation of that of Mok (or 
vice-versa) who therefore makes the same observation, see Robert Mok, 'Gevoegde zaken C-154/04 en C-155/04, 
The Queen, on the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Others v. Secretary of State for Health and 
National Assembly for Wales', (2006) 54 Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht 3, p. 124. 
50
 See for instance Renaud Dehousse, 'Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance', in Joerges 
and Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 
221; Damien Geradin, 'The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the EU should learn from the 
American Experience', (2004) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 1, p. 10; Tom Zwart, 'La Poursuite du Père 
Meroni ou pourquoi Les Agences Pourraient Jouer un Rôle plus en Vue dans l'Union Européenne', in Dutheil de la 
Rochère (ed.), L'Exécution du Droit de l'Union, entre Mécanismes Communautaires et Droits Nationaux, Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 2009, p. 166. 
51
 See for instance Ulrich Everling, 'Zur Errichtung nachgeordneter Behörden der Kommission der Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', in Hallstein and Schlochauer (eds.), Zur Integration Europas, Karlsruhe, Müller, 1965, p. 
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legislator should be able to grant significant powers to EU agencies,52 given the expanded reach of EU law 
since the Single European Act and given the effet utile principle. Today, EU law cannot acquire its useful 
effect anymore at the implementing stage without a more intensive involvement of national authorities at 
EU level, within agencies. To deny this option to the legislator would result in the insufficiently uniform 
application of EU law. Of course to be somewhat convincing such an argument would need to be 
elaborated since establishing an agency is not the only way one can come to better implementation of EU 
law. One could then argue that the agency instrument strikes a good balance between the principle of effet 
utile and the principle of subsidiarity, compared to giving implementing powers to the Commission. The 
latter option would also secure a uniform application of EU law, but it would cut of national authorities 
from the implementing process.53 
A second option which would have about the same effects (in casu) would be for the Court to rule that 
Meroni and Romano do not apply to the ‘delegations’ to EU agencies, without the Court having to depart 
from or renounce its earlier jurisprudence. Such a ruling would be perfectly possible because already in its 
existing jurisprudence it is impossible to identify one single legal regime which applies to all the different 
forms of delegation which have been elaborated under primary and secondary EU law.54 The delegations 
to the Commission under the old Article 155 EEC were organised along the lines first set out in Köster 
and then Germany v. Commission.55 The rules laid down in that jurisprudence are different from the rules 
governing delegations to private bodies such as Meroni, taken over in DRI Film International.56 The rules 
on delegations or conferrals to bodies under international public law are still different.57 Lastly, with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, primary law for the first time mentions the notion of ‘delegation’ in 
Article 290 TFEU which established yet another legal regime. Given this existing multiplicity, it would 
not be too far-fetched to suggest that the Court could rule that the legal regime governing the 
empowerment of agencies is again different from the existing regimes. Of course, the Court will be 
cautious here since this matter should actually have been dealt with by the Treaty Authors themselves. The 
question of delegating powers to EU agencies has indeed been raised at the occasion of several inter-
governmental conferences but had not been settled. Should this option materialise the Court would not 
develop a fully fletched framework but would only lay down the bare minimum of such a framework to 
allow the case before it to be solved. 
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 Of course national authorities would not be cut off completely, since the Commission would probably exercise 
these competences under a comitology procedure. But the national authorities’ role would still be more limited than 
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 See also Yves Gautier, La délégation en droit communautaire, Strasbourg, Strasbourg 3, 1995, PhD Thesis, p. 461. 
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A third option would be that the Court confirms that Meroni and/or Romano govern the empowerment of 
EU agencies (possibly constituting a single legal regime) while applying a ‘light’ interpretation of those 
rulings. As was noted above, the concepts used in these two cases are not immune from discussion. By 
adopting a narrow definition of ‘discretionary’ (or an expansive definition of ‘executive’) and a narrow 
definition of ‘acts having the force of law’, the Court could allow for the present and further (qualitative) 
agencification. For instance, acts having the force of law could be interpreted as being formal legislation, 
which would even exclude the delegated acts from its scope. Discretionary powers could be interpreted as 
the competence to make final discretionary choices. As a result, the only thing which would count is 
which authority adopts the final decision, the preliminary steps to such a final decision being irrelevant. 
Elaborating the notion of ‘choice’ the Court could also rule that the fundamental discretionary choices in 
the application of Regulation 236/2012 are already contained in the Regulation itself and as long as the 
ESMA acts within its mandate as set out in the Regulation, it cannot affect the discretionary choices made 
therein. This would be similar to Schneider’s distinction between legislative discretion in setting out the 
legal framework and administrative discretion in applying the legal rules to concrete cases or situations 
(cf. supra). Of course, pushing this option to its extremes, the end result would be the same as under the 
second option since the Court would only formally start from Meroni and/or Romano to end up with a 
legal regime which would significantly differ from the regimes originally set out in those rulings. It cannot 
be ruled out either that the Court applies a Meroni- and or Romano-light in this case and still concludes 
that the empowerment of EMSA under Regulation 236/2012 is incompatible with the Treaties. 
A last option is the simplest. The Court would confirm that Meroni and/or Romano apply to the 
empowerment of agencies and it could further confirm that these two rulings set out a single legal regime 
governing the same type of ‘delegation’.  Without an adaptation of these rulings to the current legal, 
political and administrative context (i.e. creating a Meroni- or Romano-light) the Court would be bound to 
find the empowerment of the ESMA under Regulation 236/2012 illegal. This because the ESMA has to 
make discretionary choices when it decided to prohibit or impose conditions on short selling and because 
its prohibition or its measure imposing condition would be an act having the force of law. 
The options open to the Court on the UK’s third argument are a different matter. Whereas the Court itself 
left a sufficient margin in its rulings in Meroni and Romano to allow for a more flexible interpretation of 
those judgments in the light of the current context, the Articles 290 and 291 TFEU seem to leave less 
room for manoeuvre. As was noted above, these Articles seem to have reinforced the Commission’s 
position and the only actors they mention are the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the 
Member States. How could the Court interpret these Articles in such a way as to give a meaningful role to 
the agencies in the procedures for adopting implementing and delegated acts? The UK argues that the 
measures which the ESMA would adopt would be delegated acts only but in name. Meeting all the 
characteristics of the delegated act as described in Article 290 TFEU, they should therefore also be 
recognised as such, meaning the ESMA cannot be empowered as this competence is exclusive to the 
Commission. Here the Court could in theory rule that the Treaties are not exhaustive on this point, 
meaning there may be generally applicable measures which do not belong to the categories of delegated 
acts or formal legislation. Since these measures would be different from delegated acts, despite meeting all 
the characteristics of delegated acts, they would not necessarily need to be adopted by the Commission. 
With some imagination, Article 290 TFEU could be read in this light since it provides that “[a] legislative 
act may delegate to the Commission” (own emphasis) the power to adopt delegated acts.  
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The possibility reflected in the verb ‘may’ would then not only relate to the possibility for the legislator to 
provide for such a power to the Commission, but also to a possibility for the legislator to pick the 
delegated authority of its choice. However, such an argument could only be upheld based on a purely 
textual interpretation of the provisions in Article 290 TFEU. Put into its context, Article 290 TFEU 
employs ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ since otherwise the legislator would not be allowed to deal with the non-
essential elements of legislation itself. Should the legislator want to, it should obviously have the 
possibility to deal with all the elements of legislation, essential as well as non-essential.58 Similarly it 
would seem rather far-fetched to argue that the Treaty authors provided for the delegated act of Article 
290 TFEU as only one possible non-legislative act of general application, leaving it to the legislator to 
devise other alternative categories of such acts. 
Should Articles 290 and 291 TFEU indeed be interpreted as such, i.e. attaching no special constitutional 
importance to the Commission’s role as provided in those Articles and allowing the legislator to empower 
other actors to adopt implementing and delegated acts or acts meeting the characteristics of these acts in 
all but their name, this would fundamentally alter the EU’s institutional balance. The Commission’s role 
in the decision-making process in the post-legislation phase would be at the whims of the Parliament and 
Council rather than it being defined in primary law.  
Of course, one could imagine a number of scenarios in between the two extremes of the Commission 
being the sole responsible authority under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU and that of the Commission’s 
position being completely undermined by the empowerment of other bodies. However, the problem again 
here is that it is not really the task of the Court to define those ‘exceptional situations’ in which delegated 
acts could perhaps be adopted by bodies other than the Commission. 
At the same time, nothing in the provisions of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU would prevent the legislator 
from prescribing the Commission should request and take account of the advice of other bodies, such as 
EU agencies, before it adopts delegated or implementing acts. This would mean there is ample room for 
the involvement of such bodies in these procedures, as long as the ultimate authority in these procedures is 
the Commission. 
The three pleas assessed together 
Looking at these pleas together makes clear that even if the Court would adopt a very generous 
interpretation of Meroni and/or Romano allowing for further (qualitative) agencification, the prospects of 
such agencification would be hampered by the textual provisions and context of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU, which do not seem to allow any other authority than the Commission to adopt delegated and 
implementing acts.59 One way of circumventing the Commission’s (quasi) monopoly over delegated and 
implementing acts is the option which has been relied upon extensively in the past already, i.e. de facto 
narrowing down the Commission’s discretion by providing for the (mandatory) involvement in decision-
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making procedures of the EU agencies without touching upon the Commission’s final authority to adopt 
these acts.  
The second is to take the point of view that the Treaties have not dealt with the catalogue of EU legal 
instruments in an exhaustive way and that, as a result, the legislator may establish new bodies and 
empower them to adopt new types of acts. In itself, the first part of this reasoning cannot be contested 
since the EU institutions have been adopting such acts, unforeseen by the official catalogue of Article 288 
TFEU, since the beginning of the integration process. However, these atypical acts were based on Treaty 
Articles other than Article 288 TFEU, or they were adopted by the Institutions themselves in the course of 
institutional practice.60 In his thesis, Lefevre makes a distinction between the atypical acts for which the 
EU assumes (political) responsibility and those for which it does not. However, in both cases those acts 
are adopted by actors whose intervention is foreseen by the Treaties.61 Obviously, the problem for the EU 
agencies is that their intervention is not foreseen by the Treaties. Whereas one can argue a case allowing 
for the Treaty Institutions to adopt acts other than those explicitly foreseen by the Treaties, this is different 
for the agencies. Allowing these, unforeseen and thus atypical, bodies to adopt, unforeseen and thus 
atypical, acts would risk both undermining the legality principle and opening a Pandora’s box.  
As a result, in the absence of any provision in the Treaties, it would be difficult and dangerous for the 
Court to allow the existence of (binding) atypical acts, which resemble but are distinct from delegated and 
implementing acts and which subsequently and as a result thereof may be adopted by EU agencies rather 
than by the Commission. 
VII. Agencification following Case C-270/12 
Of course it is difficult to predict how the Court will rule in this case, which is why some of the more 
extreme solutions have been presented above, making it convenient to conclude now that the Court’s 
actual solution will probably find a middle ground. It is clear that the Court will not give a complete carte 
blanche to the EU legislator to continue (qualitative) agencification. At the same time, the importance of 
the agency instrument today in delivering EU policies will equally deter the Court from placing a ban on 
that instrument. The interesting question then is whether the Court will provide a constitutional basis for 
agencification by possibly carving out a separate legal regime for agencification which would come with 
its own rules and limits to agency-empowerments. 
For this, there are two ways for the Court to proceed. First, the Court could address the issue as if it were 
acting as the Treaty authors itself, taking into account fundamental considerations such as the 
Commission’s role and function in (administrative) decision-making and how it is affected by EU 
agencies, the EU agencies’ administrative and democratic legitimacy, the nature of the EU itself and 
whether it has Kompetenz-Kompetenz on, or how far such a competence could go in relation to, its 
institutional organisation and its internal distribution of competences.  
Here a parallel may be drawn with the national debates on agencification, since the phenomenon of 
establishing independent authorities is not unknown in the national legal orders either. In most national 
states for instance, the national constitutional charter allocates the different powers to different branches 
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and as regards the executive branch the idea of a ‘unitary executive’ may often be identified,62 barring, at 
first sight, agencification. In France, Article 21 of the Constitution entrusts the tasks of executing laws and 
the pouvoir réglementaire to the prime minister, and provides he can delegate some of his powers to his 
ministers.63 A literal reading of the latter provision would have the reader conclude that the powers of the 
prime minister may therefore only be delegated to the ministers, which seems analogous to the effects of a 
literal reading of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (cf. supra). The French Conseil Constitutionnel ruled 
differently however and has allowed the legislator to entrust the task of executing legislation to an 
independent agency subject to the condition that the agency’s measures only have a limited scope as 
regards both their field of application and their content.64 The Conseil further ruled, in the same case, that 
under the principle of separation of powers it is permissible for an (independent) administrative authority 
to impose sanctions.65 Interestingly, the Conseil did struck down part of the law in question since it 
provided that the government could further regulate the sector of undertakings for collective investment in 
transferable securities by decree, since this touched upon the elements of legislation which Article 34 of 
the French Constitution reserves to the legislative branch.66  
Even though the French fifth republic and the EU were both established in 1958, the former may be 
regarded as a more mature polity. The EU has seen several profound amendments to its constitutional 
charter since 1958 and, evidently, it is not a state. Whether the Court of Justice could take the same 
progressive approach (away from the actual text of the constitutional charter) like the Conseil 
Constitutionnel, seems doubtful therefore.  
Instead, the second way for the Court to solve the issue would seem the safer and it would have it focus on 
more formal considerations such as the legal effects of acts adopted by EU agencies and the question of 
the formal authority adopting a (binding) act, leaving it to the pouvoir constituant to definitively settle the 
issue of agencification under EU primary law. In order to continue further (qualitative) agencification, the 
EU legislator would then have to grant further soft law powers to EU agencies. Incidentally, this has also 
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been noted at national level: whereas agencies under French constitutional law may be granted with a 
‘pouvoir réglementaire’, such a power still remains contentious. Senator Gélard therefore noted that even 
in the absence of such a power, an agency might de facto exercise this power if, by virtue of the agency’s 
authority, relevant parties would accept its observations or guidelines as binding, “comme si elles étaient 
dotées d’une potée normative.”67 
VIII. Establishing a framework for agencies’ soft law powers 
Although an increased reliance on EU agencies adopting soft law rather than hard law instruments, 
following the outcome of UK v. Parliament and Council, would address the immediate concerns related to 
the institutional balance,68 it would also emphasise the problematic nature of soft law in general and 
specifically that of soft law adopted by agencies. In their report on soft law following the Treaty of Lisbon 
for the European Parliament, Senden and van den Brinck dedicated special attention to this subject. 
Although both authors, incorrectly (cf. supra), assume that the agencies’ powers find their constitutional 
basis in the Meroni ruling,69 they are correct in pointing to the lack of a clear framework which applies to 
the agencies’ exercise of powers. However, such a framework seems necessary to govern the agencies’ 
soft powers and to provide greater legitimacy to such acts and to the agencies themselves. And where 
horizontal rules do apply, such as the regime of judicial review laid down in the Treaties which now also 
includes the agencies, Senden and van den Brinck identify further scope for improvement of the agency’s 
legitimacy by establishing a more generous system of judicial review vis-à-vis agencies’ acts.70  
To develop such a framework, Senden and van den Brinck identify a role for the inter-institutional 
agreement on EU agencies which the Commission had proposed in 2005.71 However, by 2008 it was 
already clear that the inter-institutional agreement would never materialise.72 In July 2012, a few months 
after Senden and van den Brinck submitted their report, the three institutions reached an agreement on a 
Common Approach on the decentralised agencies, the alternative to the inter-institutional agreement. The 
Common Approach, in any event a non-binding document, has largely codified the existing legislative 
practice of agency creation which has matured over the years.73 Further, although the Common Approach 
deals with a lot of issues, it does not provide any guidance on the subject of decision-making by agencies 
in procedures resulting in the adoption of soft law instruments.74  
Some attention to this issue would have been no luxury however, as may be concluded from Chiti’s 
analysis of the rulemaking procedures of EU agencies. Whereas he identifies a procedural pattern common 
to the agencies when they adopt binding implementing rules, “there is no evidence of an overall tendency 
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to formalise the procedures though which soft law measures are adopted.”75 Chiti notes that the 
informality characterising these procedures is not problematic per se, but that proceduralisation 
strengthens administrative legitimacy. Chiti seems to agree that in any case, it is important to ascertain the 
purpose of the soft law instrument to conclude whether it should be subjected to more formalised 
procedures. A fundamental consideration in this is whether the soft law is adopted for organisational 
purposes, structuring the internal functioning of the agency or its working relations with national 
administrations or whether the soft law is of concrete relevance to private parties. Allowing the latter to 
get involved in the agencies’ procedures would strengthen transparency and would allow the agencies to 
have access to and take account of all relevant information. As a result, the lack of formalised procedures 
to this end is seen as “a genuine lacuna of European agencies’ rulemaking” by Chiti.76 In her critical 
analysis of the Common Approach, Bernard does not specifically deal with this question, but she did 
comment on the advisory powers which the agencies exercise vis-à-vis the Commission, noting that 
“[l]'approche commune occultant l'existence de telles prérogatives au bénéfice des agences, la question 
des limites aux délégations qui leur sont consenties n'est pas abordée.”77 Logically, if not even the limits 
to agencies’ powers are dealt with in the Common Approach, it is evident that any contemplation on (a 
framework for) the agencies’ soft law powers is lacking as well. 
The institutions’ lack of attention to this issue will evidently become even more problematic should the 
Court’s ruling in UK v. Parliament and Council, depending on the solution adopted, indeed result in more 
soft law powers for the agencies. 
This eventuality would then be a good occasion for the Commission to make use of one of the new powers 
which the EU acquired under the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 298 (2) TFEU now allows the EU legislator to 
adopt a law on administrative procedure, whereas pre-Lisbon “there were doubts as to whether the EU 
had competence to enact such a measure.”78 Senden and van den Brinck have also identified this Treaty 
Article as a legal base to establish “procedural modalities of the use of soft rule-making.”79 So far, the 
Commission has not adopted a proposal yet and when the Parliament adopted an own-initiative report 
invited the Commission to do so,80 the latter did not react very enthusiastically. In any event, the 
Parliament’s report remained rather general as it did not contain special recommendations for rules 
applicable to either agencies or soft law, let alone soft law adopted by EU agencies. Still, Article 298 
TFEU refers to regulations (plural) to be adopted by the legislator, which means a specific regulation 
devoted to soft law procedures could also be envisaged.81  
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IX. Conclusion 
‘To be continued...’ would be a fitting (preliminary) conclusion to the above sections.  
Undoubtedly, the Court’s ruling in UK v. Parliament and Council will be of fundamental importance for 
the process of agencification and depending on the actual solution adopted, it could also have important 
consequences for the use of soft law by agencies. 
Should the Court choose to adopt a more formalistic approach, e.g. prohibiting agencies from adopting 
binding (generally applicable) acts, in solving the case it could leave ample scope to the legislator to 
continue qualitative agencification by granting soft law powers to EU agencies. 
Still, the political institutions’ have not only failed to come to shared understanding of the role and place 
of the agencies in the EU’s institutional order, leaving the Court of Justice in a difficult situation 
concerning the limits to agencies’ powers. In their Common Approach on EU agencies, the political 
institutions have also failed to address the issue of administrative rule-making, through soft law, by EU 
agencies. An even greater reliance on soft law by EU agencies would therefore be questionable from this 
perspective. 
The possibility opened by the Lisbon Treaty, under Article 298 TFEU, to adopt regulations shaping an 
open, efficient and independent European administration offers a repêchage for the institutions to remedy 
at least this deficiency in the Common Approach even if it seems doubtful that this opportunity will 
actually be seized in the short term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
